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Comments
The Validity of Local Right-to-Work
Ordinances under Federal and Missouri Law
I. INTRODUCTION'

Section 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act regulates union security
agreements. Section 8(a)(3) prohibits closed shop agreements, but permits

union shop and agency shop agreements that meet certain criteria.2 Closed
shop agreements require employers to hire union members only. Union shop
agreements allow employers to hire non-union employees, but require the

1. The author thanks Donald W. Jones of Hulston, Jones, Gammon and Marsh,
Springfield, Missouri, for his assistance and guidance in preparing this Comment.
2. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.

§ 158(a)(3) (1988).
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.., by discrimination
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided,That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of
the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement

with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any
action defined in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as
a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day
following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such
agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees as provided in section 159(a) of this title,
in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement
when made, and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section
159(e) of this title within one year preceding the effective date of such
agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the
employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the
authority of such labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided
further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an
employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has
reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available
to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to
other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that
membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of
the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly
required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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employees to become members of the union soon after they are hired.
Agency shop agreements do not require employees to become members of the
union, but require them to pay the equivalent of union dues.
Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act allows states to enact laws that are
more restrictive than federal law. Section 14(b) permits states to enact rightto-work laws, which prohibit union shop and agency shop agreements
compelling employees to join or financially support a union.' While section
14(b) makes it clear that federal law will not preempt a state's power to enact
right-to-work laws, courts disagree on whether federal law preempts a local
government's power to enact a right-to-work ordinance. Courts also disagree
on whether a local government may enact a right-to-work ordinance when the
state legislature has declined to do so.
Several Missouri cities and counties have sought to enact right-to-work
ordinances, apparently trying to prevent industries from locating in neighboring right-to-work states. This Comment will consider the validity of local
right-to-work ordinances under federal and Missouri law.
II. FEDERAL LAW
A. Legislative History
The debate over whether federal law permits local governments to enact
right-to-work ordinances centers on congressional intent in enacting sections
8(a)(3) and 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Therefore, a review of the

3. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Mobil Oil, 426 U.S. 407, 410 n.1 (1976).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the agency shop is permitted under
§ 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Unions and employers may
enter agreements requiring all employees to pay union dues regardless of whether they
become union members, but may not require actual membership. "'Membership' as
a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core." NLRB v. General
Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963). The Court also has held that the union may
not exact or use money received from non-union members for activities unrelated to
collective bargaining. Communication Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762,
reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988). Additionally, the union must provide precollection disclosure and an advance reduction of a dissenting employee's dues or fees
to eliminate clearly nonchargeable costs. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v.
Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305-06 (1986).
4. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b)
(1988). "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or
application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is
prohibited by State or Territorial law." Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/3
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legislative history of these sections and the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of that history may shed some light on the issue.5
6
Prior to the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) ,
state statutes and common law governed union security agreements. In 1935,
Congress enacted the Wagner Act to regulate labor relations.7 Section 8(3)
of the Wagner Act permitted closed shop agreements and placed few
restrictions on union security agreements! This section was added to the bill
to counteract the view that the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) 9
outlawed the closed shop.1 ° Section 8(3) of the Wagner Act was not
intended to change state law in any regard, but rather to clarify congressional
intent in the previously enacted NIRA.
In interpreting the language of section 8(3), the Supreme Court stated
that rather than promoting the use of union security agreements, section 8(3)
"merely disclaim[ed] a national policy hostile to the closed shop or other
forms of union-security agreement."'"
In forming this conclusion, the
Supreme Court relied on a Senate Report that stated "the bill does nothing to
facilitate closed-shop agreements or to make them legal in any State where
they may be illegal; it does not interfere with the status quo but leaves the
way open to such agreements as might now be legally consummated ... ,,12
The Court also cited statements by Senator Wagner to the effect, "[t]he
provision will not change the status quo.' 3 This language strongly supports

5. The legislative history of sections 8(a)(3) and 14(b) were discussed in two
Stanford Law Review articles in the late 1950s. For the argument that federal law
does not preempt local right-to-work ordinances, see Berke & Brunn, Local Right to
Work Ordinances:A New Problem in Labor and Local Law, 9 STAN. L. REV. 674
(1957). For the argument that federal law does preempt local right-to-work ordinances,
see Finman, Local "Rightto Work" Ordinances:A Reply, 10 STAN. L. REV. 53 (1957).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1935).
7. Id.
8. Section 8(3) of the Wagner Act states
Provided,That nothing in this Act... or in any other statute of the United
States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization ... to require as a condition of employment membership
therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as
provided in section 9(a) ....
Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S.
301, 307 (1949).
9. 48 Stat. 198 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 701 (1988)).
10. Algoma Plywood, 336 U.S. at 307-08 (citing S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 11-12 (1935)).
11. Id. at 307.
12. Id. at 308 (quoting S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1935)).
13. Id. at 310 (quoting 79 CONG. REc. 7673 (1935) (statement of Senator
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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a finding that there was no intent by Congress to preempt state laws banning
union security agreements when it enacted section 8(3).
In the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Congress amended section 8(3) of the
Wagner Act, adding restrictions to curb abuses of union security agreements. 14 The new section, 8(a)(3), outlawed the closed shop and placed
restrictions on agency and union shop agreements.' s By outlawing the closed
shop, Congress intended to eliminate some of the abuses of compulsory
unionism; for example, unions could no longer expel employees and then seek
to have employers discharge them for reasons other than non-payment of
dues.' 6 Congress continued to permit regulated agency and union shop
agreements to assuage the fears of union officials that employees who received
the benefits of collective bargaining agreements would not pay their share of
7
the costs.'
With the amendments, the question again arose whether Congress was so
heavily regulating union security agreements as to occupy the field and
preempt state laws. The Supreme Court answered this question in Algoma
Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board," stating
that because section 8(a)(3) strictly regulated union shop agreements, Congress
added section 14(b) "to forestall the inference that federal policy was to be

Wagner)).
14. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740 (1963).
15. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
158(a)(3) (1988). The Act bans the closed shop agreement with the following
provision:
Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the
United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with
a labor organization... to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such
employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is later.
Id. Section 8(a)(3) also places restrictions on security agreements with the following
language:
Providedfurther, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against
an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has
reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available
to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to
other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that
membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of
the employee to tender periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly
required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
Id.
16. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. at 740-41.
17. Id.
18. 336 U.S. 301 (1948).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/3
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exclusive." 19 Language from the conference committee report on section
14(b) supports the Supreme Court's conclusion. The conference committee
report states, "[ilt was never the intention of the National Labor Relations
Act, as is disclosed by the legislative history of that act, to preempt the field
... so as to deprive the States of their powers to prevent compulsory
unionism." 2
The Supreme Court's decision in Retail Clerks InternationalAssociation
W2
v. Schermerhorn
' lends more support to the view that federal law defers to
state policy on the issue of union security agreements.22 The Court, in
explaining the legislative history of section 14(b), stated that Congress's "clear
and unambiguous purpose" was to not preempt the field.23 The Court went
on to say that Congress sanctioned conflict between state and federal laws and

that state laws barring union security agreements must prevail. 24 In addition,
the Court stated that Congress "chose to abandon any search for uniformity
in the problems of state laws barring the execution and application of [union
security] agreements."' The state's interest in preventing compulsory union
membership is so strong that federal law must yield.

19. Id. at 313. InAlgoma, an employee was fired for refusing to join the union.
The union security clause, under which the employee was fired, was invalid under
Wisconsin law because no referendum was conducted to appoint the union as the
workers' representative. The issue was whether the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board had jurisdiction to adjudicate this unfair labor practices claim or whether the
NLRA preempted the state's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court interpreted § 8(3) of the
Wagner Act and held that federal law was not preemptive: "section 8(3) merely
disclaims a national policy hostile to the closed shop or other forms of union-security
agreement." Id. at 307. States can enact and enforce laws on security agreements
that are more restrictive than federal law. "Had the sponsors of the National Labor
Relations Act meant to deny effect to State policies inconsistent with the unrestricted
enforcement of union-shop contracts, surely they would have made their purpose
manifest." Id at 306.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of state right-to-work laws in
Lincoln Fed. Labor Union No. 19129 v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525,
529-37 (1949).
20. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1947).
21. 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
22. The issue in this case was whether a state court had jurisdiction to enforce
state right-to-work laws or if the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction. The Court held
that states have jurisdiction, reasoning as follows: "Since it is plain that Congress left
the States free to legislate in that field, we can only assume that it intended to leave
unaffected the power to enforce those laws." Id. at 102.
23. Id. at 101 (citing H.R. REP No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1947)).
24. Id. at 103.
25. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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B. Statutory Construction: "State or TerritorialLaw"
While section 14(b) and the Supreme Court cases make it clear that states
may ban union security agreements, there is ambiguity about what is included
in "state law." The Supreme Court often has dealt with issues that require
defining "state law," and the type of law considered may determine the scope
of the definition. There is ample support for the proposition that "state law"
means all the laws of the state, including those determined by political
subdivisions.
Prior to the Wagner Act, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case,
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.26 Erie required the Court to define the "laws
of the several states" as referred to in the Federal Judiciary Act of September
24, 1789.27 In Erie, the Court expressly overruled the earlier doctrine in
Swift v. Tyson,28 which interpreted the "laws of the several states" to mean
state statutes, but not common law. The Erie Court stated, "Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be
applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law of the State
shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in
decision is not a matter of federal concern." 29 The Court noted that under
the Swift v. Tyson doctrine, federal courts had ignored state law, in contravention of the United States Constitution, which "recognizes and preserves the
autonomy and independence of the states ...in their legislative ...and
judicial departments. 30 The Court stated in unequivocal terms that state law
should prevail in the absence of controlling federal law.
In King Manufacturing Co. v. City Council of Augusta,31 the Supreme
Court was asked to decide whether a city ordinance violated the United States
Constitution. Before turning to the merits of the claim, the Court addressed
the issue of jurisdiction.32 Section 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended by
the Act of February 13, 1925, stated that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction

26. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
27. The Court stated that
[s]ection 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, 28
U.S.C. § 725 ...provides 'The laws of the several states, except where
the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decisions in civil
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.'
Id. at 64-65 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 725 (1936)).
28. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
29. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
30. Id. at 79.
31. 277 U.S. 100 (1928).
32. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/3
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to determine if the "statute of any state" was unconstitutional.33 The Court
held that a city ordinance was a state statute within the meaning of section
237 and said the following about state statutes:
[I]t rests with each state to determine in what form and by what agency its
legislative power may be exerted. It may legislate little or much in its
constitution, may permit the electorate to make laws by direct vote, may
entrust its legislature with wide lawmaking functions and may delegate
legislative authority to subordinate agencies such as municipal councils and
state commissions. But whether this power be exerted in one form or
another, or by one agency or another, the enactments put forth, whether
called constitutional provisions, laws, ordinances or orders, are in essence
legislative acts of the state ....34
In District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co.,35 the Supreme Court
recognized that "decision after decision has held that the delegated power of
municipalities is as broad as the police power of the state, except as3 6 that
power may be restricted by terms of grant or by the state constitution."
In June 1991, the Supreme Court considered whether the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempted a town
ordinance regulating pesticides.37 Section 24(a) of the Act gave states the
power to regulate the sale or use of pesticides.' The Court, in holding that

political subdivisions were included in the meaning of "State," said
the exclusion of political subdivisions cannot be inferred from the express
authorization to the 'State[s]' because political subdivisions are components
of the very entity the statute empowers. Indeed, the more plausible reading
of FIFRA's authorization to the States leaves the allocation of regulatory
authority to the 'absolute discretion' of the States themselves, including the
option of leaving local regulation of pesticides in the hands of local
authorities.3 9

33. Id. at 102.
34. Id. at 103-04 (quoting Standard Computing Scale Co. v. Farrell, 249 U.S. 571,
577 (1919)).
35. 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
36. Id. at 108-09 (citing E. MCQUILUN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 16.02 (3d ed. 1949)).
37. Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S.Ct. 2476 (1991).
38. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, § 24(a), 92 Stat. 835
(1978) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (1988)).
39. Wisconsin Public Intervenor, 111 S.Ct. at 2483.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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Numerous other cases also have held that state statutes include municipal
ordinances. 40
In short, states have the power to delegate authority to their political
subdivisions. As long as a city ordinance does not violate the federal
Constitution or federal laws, only the state may declare that the ordinance is
invalid. Section 14(b) clearly says that federal law does not preempt a state's
right to ban compulsory unionism. Therefore, only a state should have the
authority to determine the validity of a municipal right-to-work ordinance.
Because section 14(b) expressly negates any intent to imply federal preemption, it defies logic to infer that Congress intended to deny states full freedom
to legislate bans on compulsory unionism at any level.
C. FederalPreemptionPrinciples
Congress has the power, within constitutional limitations, to preempt state
laws.41 The source of federal preemption is the supremacy clause, which
states that the laws of the United States shall be the supreme law of the
land.42 Courts dealing with preemption must determine whether Congress,
in enacting legislation, intended to preempt state laws. 43 There is a presumption against finding that Congress intended to preempt state law.4 This
presumption is based on a public policy to protect state sovereignty against

40. North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 313 (1908) (a
municipal ordinance is "in effect a statute of the state, adopted under a power granted
it by the state legislature"); New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co.,
125 U.S. 18, 31 (1888) ("any enactment from whatever source originating, to which
a State gives the force of law is a statute of the state; this includes a bylaw or
ordinance of a municipal corporation"); Stevens v. Griffith, 111 U.S. 48 (1884) (a
confederate enactment treated as law by the state of Tennessee is equivalent to a
statute of Tennessee); Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 603-04 (1878) ("an act of the
confederate Congress, recognized and enforced as law in Mississippi must be
•.. therefore, regarded by us as a statute of that State") Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S.
176, 183 (1877) ("[a]ny enactment from whatever source originating, to which a state
gives the force of law, is a statute of the state").
41. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
42. See U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;. . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
43. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 203-04.
44. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/3
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federal encroachment.45 Therefore, unless Congress is explicit in its intent
to preempt state laws, courts should not find federal preemption.
The Supreme Court divides preemption analysis into three, broad
categories: express preemption; occupation of the field; and direct conflict.4 7
Express preemption occurs when Congress clearly indicates its intent to
preempt state laws. 48 Occupation of the field arises when there is a "scheme
of federal regulation ...so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the states to supplement it . . . ,"49 Direct conflict
involves situations where "compliance with both federal and state regulations
is a physical impossibility."50 Conflict may also occur when state law
discourages activities that federal law intends to promote. For example, in
Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission,51 the Court struck down a state
unemployment compensation law because it discouraged workers from filing
unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board

(NLRB).

52

There is little authority on the issue of whether a city may enact a rightto-work ordinance. Only three cases have specifically addressed the issue and
their responses have been contradictory.
In Chavez v. Sargent,53 the
California District Court of Appeals was asked to determine the validity of a
right-to-work ordinance passed by San Benito County. The court held that
state law preempted the ordinance. The court also discussed whether federal
law would preempt such an ordinance.54 In analyzing the effect of federal
law on the ordinance, the court did not find express preemption, federal
occupation of the field, or direct conflict.55 The court stated, "Certainly the
normal and customary construction of 'State Law' encompasses county
ordinances. There is nothing in the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act

45. L. TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 479-80 (2d ed. 1988).
46. Id.
47. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 203-04.
48. Id. at 203 (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
49. Id. at 204 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 153 (1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
50. Id. at 204 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963)).
51. 389 U.S. 235, 239 (1967).
52. Id. at 239.
53. 329 P.2d 579 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958), vacated, 339 P.2d 801 (1959). On
appeal, the Supreme Court of California only addressed the issue of whether the rightto-work ordinance conflicted with state law. The court said that because no allegation

of interstate commerce was raised, federal preemption was not an issue.
54. Id. at 582-83.
55. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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or in the Act itself to indicate that Congress left the
field open for state
56
legislation but pre-empted it as to county legislation.
Two cases have decided that federal law preempts municipal right-towork ordinances on the theories that Congress occupied the field and that
there is direct conflict between the goals of the NLRA and a municipal rightto-work ordinance.
In Kentucky State AFL-CIO v. Pucket,57 labor organizations appealed
a judgment upholding a city right-to-work ordinance. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment on the grounds that the NLRA preempted a
city right-to-work ordinance. The court said that by enacting section 8(a)(3)
Congress intended to preempt state laws involving union security agreements,
and therefore, Congress added section 14(b) to carve a narrow exception to
preemption. 8 The court reasoned that if Congress did not intend to preempt
state law, then section 14(b) would serve no purpose other than to restate that
fact.5 9 The court, however, ignored legislative history cited by the United
States Supreme Court in Retail Clerks InternationalAssociation v. Schermerhorn,60 which stated that 14(b) was included only to prevent the interpretation that federal law was to be exclusive. 61 The Puckett court also stated that
a municipal right-to-work ordinance is a "departure from the spirit and
purpose of the NLRA," yet the court neglected to specify what purposes the
ordinance contravened. 62
The Puckett court did not cite specific legislative history in making its
determination, but rather it spoke in broad terms about the purpose of the
NLRA:
We think it is not reasonable to believe that Congress could have intended
to waive other than to major policy-making units such as states and
territories, the determination of policy in such a controversial area as that
of union-security agreements. We believe Congress was willing to permit
varying policies at the state level, but could not have intended to allow as
many local policies as there are local political subdivisions in the nation.6

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 582 n.3.
391 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1965).
Id. at 362.
Id.
375 U.S. 96 (1963).
Id. at 101.
Puckett, 391 S.W.2d at 362.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/3
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United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 1564 v. Clovis 4 is
the most recent case holding that federal law preempts local right-to-work
ordinances. The city of Clovis was a home-rule city, which under the New
Mexico Constitution was granted all legislative powers not "expressly denied
by general law or charter."65 Clovis enacted a right-to-work ordinance
prohibiting employers from requiring employees to join or financially support
a union as a condition of employment.6 Labor organizations sued, alleging
that the NLRA preempted the city ordinance. The United States district court,
using the theories of occupation of the field and direct conflict, held that the
67
NLRA did preempt the city ordinance.
Starting with the premise that section 8(a)(3) comprehensively regulates
union security agreements, the court reasoned that the terms "States or
Territories" in section 14(b) create a narrow exception to preemption.6 The
court also found direct conflict between local right-to-work ordinances and the
purposes behind the NLRA. The court, citing a congressional purpose to
"encourage bargaining on 'conditions of employment,"' stated that local rightto-work ordinances would discourage collective bargaining. 69 The court
found that subjecting a union to numerous laws would "create an administrative burden and an incentive to abandon union security agreements." 70 The
court did not rely on legislative history behind sections 8(a)(3) and 14(b) in
reaching its decision because it found the legislative history could support
either side of the issue, and thus was unhelpful.
The Puckett and Clovis courts reached the wrong result for several
reasons. One reason is that the weight of legislative history shows there was
no intent to preempt a state's right to ban union security agreements. The
conference committee report on section 14(b) was very explicit:
Many States have enacted laws or adopted constitutional provisions to make
all forms of compulsory unionism in those States illegal. It was never the
intention of the National Labor Relations Act, as is disclosed by the
legislative history of that act, to preempt the field in this regard so as to
deprive the States of their powers to prevent compulsory unionism. Neither
the so-called "closed shop" proviso in section 8(3) of the existing act nor
the union shop and maintenance of membership proviso in section 8(a)(3)
of the conference agreement could be said to authorize arrangements of this
sort in States where such arrangements were contrary to the State policy.

64. 735 F. Supp. 999 (D.N.M. 1990).

65. Id. at 1000 (quoting N.M. CONST. art. X, § 6(D)).
66. Id. at 1001.
67. Id. at 1003.

68. Id. at 1003-04.
69. Id. at 1003.
70. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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To make certain that there should be no question about this, section 13 was
included in the House bill. The conference71 agreement in section 14(b)
contains a provision having the same effect.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the legislative history in Retail
Clerks International Association v. Schermerhorn,7 also indicates that
section 8(a)(3) was not meant to preempt state law. The Court stated that

14(b) was included in the act to make "clear and unambiguous the purpose of
Congress not to preempt the field."73 The Court went on to say that the
conflict between state and federal law on the issue of union security
agreements is "sanctioned by Congress with directions to give the right of way
to state laws barring the execution and enforcement of union-security
agreements." 74 Both the legislative history of sections 8(a)(3) and 14(b) and
the Supreme Court opinions contradict the Clovis and Puckett courts' holdings
that federal law is preemptive and that 14(b) carves a narrow exception for
states to ban union security agreements. Section 14(b) is not a narrow
exception to preemption, but rather is an explicit statement that no preemption
was intended. Therefore, the words "State Law" in section 14(b) should be
given their natural meaning-that is, all the laws of the state.
The Clovis and Puckett courts' argument that numerous right-to-work
ordinances would create an administrative burden for unions may be correct.
However, despite potential administrative burdens, Congress has sanctioned
non-uniformity in banning union security agreements. Congress made it clear
that nonuniform policies within a state are permissible when it included
section 9(e) in the NLRA. 5 Even in states without a right-to-work law,
employees in a bargaining unit have the right under section 9(e) to "deauthorize" the union security agreement. Thus, not only does Congress sanction
varying policies among the states, but it sanctions varying policies among
bargaining units within a state. Section 9(e) lends further support to the view
that local right-to-work ordinances should be valid under federal law.

71. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1947).
72. 375 U.S. 96, 99-103 (1963).
73. Id. at 101.
74. Id. at 103.
75. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e) (1988). Section 9(e) of the NLRA provides the following:
Upon the filing with the Board, by 30 per centum or more of the employees
in a bargaining unit covered by an agreement between their employer and
a labor organization made pursuant to section 158(a)(3) of this title, of a
petition alleging they desire that such authority be rescinded, the Board
shall take a secret ballot of the employees in such unit and certify the
results thereof to such labor organization and to the employer.
See Fisher & Kaemmerer, Union Shop DeauthorizationElections--Impact of a Rightto-Work Law in Missouri Today, 35 J. Mo. BAR 48 (1979).
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The argument that local right-to-work laws violate the spirit of the NLRA
also is incorrect. Section 14(b) is an acknowledgement by Congress that
union security agreements are somewhat intrusive on individual rights, and
therefore, Congress left it to the states to outlaw such agreements as against
public policy. The Supreme Court has stated that "Congress chose not to
establish a uniform national rule permitting the union shop. States were to be
left free to determine that security arrangements of any sort were against the
public interest."76 Congress left states "free to outlaw union-security
agreements in the interest of a perceived policy of keeping industrial relations
more individualistic, open and free."77
Additionally, the Puckett and Clovis courts failed to note a Supreme
Court trend against finding preemption in labor cases.
D. Labor Preemption Trends
In the past twenty-five years the Supreme Court consistently has cut back
on the labor preemption doctrine.78 This trend, which has been significant,
further indicates that the Supreme Court would hold that federal law does not
preempt local right-to-work ordinances.
The leading labor preemption case is San DiegoBuilding Trades Council
v. Garmon.79 The issue in Garmon was whether a California court had
jurisdiction to award damages for conduct constituting an unfair labor practice
under state law. The Supreme Court, emphasizing the need for broad
principles rather than case-by-case analysis, held that federal preemption
applied if a labor activity was arguably protected by section 7 or prohibited
by section 8 of the NLRA. ° The Court also held that only the National
Labor Relations Board, not the federal courts, could determine whether
conduct was protected or prohibited. 1 Garmon's preemption doctrine was
so strong that if the NLRB declined jurisdiction, the plaintiff would have no
forum available.
The Garmon Court permitted at least two narrow exceptions to preemption: (1) peripheral matters-states continued to have power to regulate
conduct that was peripheral to the goals of the NLRA; 82 and (2) local

76. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407,
426 (1976).
77. Id. at 429-30.
78. See Gregory, The LaborPreemptionDoctrine: HamiltonianRenaissance or
Last Hurrah, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 507 (1986).
79. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).

80. Id. at 245.
81. Id. at 244-45.
82. Id. at 243-44.
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concerns--states could regulate conduct that "touched interests so deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling
congressional direction, [the court] could not infer that Congress had deprived
the States of the power to act."' 3 Also subsumed under local concerns were
threats to public order-states could regulate violent conduct that presented
"imminent threats to the public order."' 4
Since Garmon, the labor preemption doctrine has been reined in
In Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114,6 the
significantly.8
Court broadened the exceptions to the Garmon preemption doctrine to include
defamation. The Court held that the NLRB did not have exclusive jurisdiction, and the NLRA did not prevent a court from awarding damages for
In Linn, sections 8 and 9 of the NLRA
defamation under state law.8
could have found that intentional false
NLRB
the
because
applied
arguably
were so coercive or damaging that
campaign
statements during an organization
Also,
there were unfair labor practices or that the election was invalid.'
9
Under
section 7 arguably protected statements that were not defamatory.
Garmon, only the NLRB has jurisdiction to determine whether arguably
prohibited or protected conduct is indeed covered by the Act. In Linn,
however, the Supreme Court determined that preemption should not apply,
reasoning that the defamation claim was peripheral to the concerns of the
NLRA and that it involved interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility."' 9
Probably the most significant erosidn of the Garmon preemption doctrine
9
occurred in Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 25, ' and
9
Carpenters.
of
Council
District
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
In Farmer, a union member sued the union and its officers for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 3 The issue was whether federal law
preempted a claim under state tort law. The Supreme Court held there was

83. Id. at 244.
84. Id. at 247 (citing United Auto. Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1957);
United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954)).
85. For a broad-ranging summary of Supreme Court decisions on the Garnon
doctrine, see Gregory, supra note 78.
86. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
87. Id. at 61-67.
88. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158-159 (1988).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
90. Linn, 383 U.S. at 62.
91. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
92. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
93. Farmer,430 U.S. at 293.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/3
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no preemption.' The Court conceded that the conduct of the officers might
constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8 of the Act; however, the
Court did not support applying "a rigid application of the Garmon doctrine."9 5 Instead, the Court used a balancing test to weigh the interference
with federal labor policy against the "legitimate and substantial interest of the
State in protecting its citizens."'
In Sears, the Court held that state courts have jurisdiction to enforce
trespass laws against union picketers.' Picketing was "arguably protected"
by section 7 of the NLRA, and so under Garmon, preemption would have
applied. The Court stated that "the history of the labor pre-emption doctrine
in this Court does not support an approach which sweeps away state-court
jurisdiction over conduct traditionally subject to state regulation without
careful consideration of the relative impact of such a jurisdictional bar on the
various interests affected.""'
The Sears case trimmed Garmon's preemption doctrine even more than
the Farmer case. Farmer dealt with a tort claim-a subject that the NLRA
did not address. Sears, however, dealt with picketing, which is regulated in
sections 7 and 8 of the Act. Sears was a much stronger case than Farmerfor
applying Garmon's preemption doctrine, yet the Court declined to find
preemption.
Another case that backs away from federal preemption is New York
Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor.99 In New York
Telephone, there was no claim that the state tried to regulate conduct protected
or prohibited by the NLRA, so the Garmon analysis did not apply. One of the
issues, however, was whether the Machinists doctrine applied.'00 The
Machinists doctrine requires a court to find state action preempted when
"Congress intended that the conduct involved be unregulated...
[and] left 'to
10
be controlled by the free play of economic forces.'

94. Id. at 295-306.
95. Id. at 302.
96. Id. at 304.
97. Sears, 436 U.S. at 190-98.
98. Id. at 188.
99. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
100. Lodge 76, Int'l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1975).
101. Id. at 140 (citing NLRB v. Nash-Fince Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)). In
Machinists,an employer filed an unfair labor practices charge with the NLRB and with
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board because during negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement, union members refused to work overtime. Id. The
NLRB dismissed the claim stating that the refusal to work overtime was not covered
by the NLRA. Id. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, however, held that
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In New York Telephone, petitioners claimed that New York's unemployment compensation statute was invalid because it was in direct conflict with
the policies of the NLRA and the Social Security Act.1O' New York had an
unemployment insurance system, financed by employers, that compensated
workers who were unemployed due to a strike."°3 Petitioners claimed this
statute changed the economic balance of power between employers and labor,
and thus conflicted with the NLRA. The petitioners
claimed that the statute
4
themselves:1
against
strikes
finance
to
them
forced
The Supreme Court held that the statute was not preempted by the
NLRA or the Social Security Act.105 The Court cited the legislative history
of those Acts and reasoned that because the statute was a law of general
application and because it did not seek to govern labor-management relations,
federal preemption could not easily be presumed.'0 The Court said that
state unemployment compensation programs should be treated
with the same deference . . . afforded analogous state laws of general
applicability that protect interests 'deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility.' With respect to such laws, we have stated 'that in the
absence of compelling congressional direction, we could
not infer that
1 07
Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.'
The Court could have struck down the New York statute under the
Machinists doctrine because the statute covered conduct that "Congress
implicitly intended to be governed only by the free play of economic
forces. ''icn Machinists was cited for the proposition that the "crucial
inquiry" is "whether the exercise of state authority to curtail or entirely
prohibit self-help would frustrate the effective implementation of the policies

the refusal to work overtime constituted an unfair labor practice under state law and
ordered the union to cease and desist. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that refusing to work overtime was an economic weapon that was not
"regulable by States any more than by the NLRB, for neither States nor the Board is
'afforded flexibility in picking and choosing which economic devices of labor and
management shall be branded as unlawful."' Id. at 149 (citing NLRB v. Insurance
Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 498 (1960)).
102. New York Telephone, 440 U.S. at 525-27.
103. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 590(7) (McKinney Supp. 1978-79).
104. New York Telephone, 440 U.S. at 523-25.
105. Id. at 527-46.
106. Id. at 540-45.
107. Id. at 540 (citing San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 244 (1959)).
108. Id. at 531.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/3
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of the National Labor Relations Act."'' 9 Here the employer's self- help,
withholding wages, was undercut by its having to pay unemployment benefits.
However, the Court distinguished Machinists by stating the statute did "not
involve any attempt by the State to regulate or prohibit private conduct in the
labor-management field."" Rather, the statute's purpose was to provide an
efficient means of insuring employment security in the state.
The plurality opinion's interpretation of the Machinists doctrine was
controversial. Justice Blackmun's concurrence states
the plurality appears to be saying that there is no pre-emption unless
'compelling congressional direction' indicates otherwise. The premise is
therefore one of assumed priority on the state side. In Machinistson the
other hand, the Court said, I thought, that there is pre-emption unless there
is evidence of congressional intent to tolerate the state practice. That
premise, therefore, is one of assumed priority on the federal side."'
New York Telephone came down heavily on the side of state rights, signalling
that the Court would no longer presume federal labor preemption.
Considering the reasons behind the erosion of the labor preemption
doctrine may be helpful in determining how the Supreme Court would rule on
the validity of local right-to-work ordinances. When Congress enacted the
NLRA in 1935, it effected a major change in national labor policy." 2 Prior
to the enactment of the NLRA, union activity was considered a conspiracy and
was discouraged.1 3
The NLRA legalized and encouraged collective
bargaining as a mechanism to prevent work stoppages. Because the NLRA
instituted new and controversial policies, there was concern that "hostile and

relatively uninformed" state and federal courts might frustrate congressional
purposes behind the Act.1 4 Therefore, federal preemption of state law was
readily found. Now that collective bargaining has matured, the earlier caution
is no longer required, and the Court is willing to use a flexible balancing test.
The Court looks at the equities of the situation, weighing the potential for
state interference with national labor policy against the state interest.
If the Supreme Court were to consider the issue of whether federal law
preempts local right-to-work ordinances, it would likely find against

109. Id.
110. Id. at 532.
111. Id. at 549 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
112. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 190 (1978).
113. Id. at 217 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
114. W. OBERER, K. HANSLOWE, J. ANDERSEN, T. HEINSZ, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW COLLECTIvE BARGAINING IN A FREE SOcIETY 371 (3d ed.

1986).
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preemption. Certainly, the right to not join a union is firmly rooted in local
interests, which is one of the exceptions to the Garmon doctrine. The Court
also has made it clear that absent explicit Congressional intent to preempt
state law, preemption will not be found easily. In the case of right-to-work
ordinances, there is an explicit statement in section 14(b) that "any state" law
is not preempted. This statement suggests that Congress has left states
complete freedom to ban union security agreements through any law
recognized as valid by the state, including local ordinances. Because of the
presumption against preemption, there is no reason to interpret "state law"
narrowly.
E. Conclusion
Federal law should not be found to preempt a local right-to-work
ordinance. The legislative histories of sections 8(a)(3) and 14(b) reveal a
congressional intent not to infringe on a state's power to ban union security
agreements. States have authority to delegate power to local governments;
therefore, state law includes municipal laws that the state has approved or
recognized. Principles of federalism require effect to be given to all state laws
that are within the bounds of the United States Constitution.
Additionally, the Supreme Court is moving away from a rigid analytical
approach in which it nearly always found federal preemption toward a more
equitable balancing approach. Because the congressional policies behind the
NLRA are now widely accepted, they are less likely to be contravened by
hostile lower courts. As a result, courts more capably can weigh competing
interests, and a finding of federal preemption is less likely to result.
III. MISSOURI LAW
If a local right-to-work ordinance is not preempted by federal law, the
ordinance must still clear the hurdle of state preemption to be valid. The
power of a local government to enact ordinances is derived from the Missouri
Constitution and statutes. The Missouri Constitution and statutes provide for
several forms of local government, including constitutional charter cities, n 5
constitutional charter counties,1 6 third class cities,1 7 and fourth class
cities. 1 Constitutional charter cities are given greater powers than other
forms of local government. This Comment focuses only on the power of a
constitutional charter city to enact a right-to-work ordinance.

115. Mo. CONsT. art. VI, § 19.
116. Id. § 18.
117. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 77.010-.660 (1986).
118. Id. §§ 79.010-.550.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/3
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Missouri has had constitutional charter provisions (home rule provisions)
since 1875.119 Originally, home rule charters were limited by the condition
that they be "consistent with and subject to the Constitution and the laws of
the State ...."'
This provision appeared to mean state statutes would
always prevail over conflicting local ordinances. The Missouri Supreme Court
held, however, that in some circumstances home-rule ordinances should
prevail over state statutes, and it developed tests to determine if the subject of

the ordinance was local or municipal in character.121 If the ordinance
regulated matters that were local or municipal, the ordinance prevailed over
conflicting state statutes; if the ordinance regulated matters of statewide
concern, it was held invalid. The tests created confusion because of the
difficulty in determining whether activities were primarily of local or statewide
concern." The result of this confusion was that home-rule cities, unsure
of the scope of their powers, often opted not to enact ordinances unless there
was a specific grant of power from the state legislature.'13 Thus, the
purposes behind home rule charters-to provide local autonomy and to
distribute power between state and local governments 24--were undermined.1 2
In 1971, Missouri voters elected to amend the state constitution by adding
article VI, section 19(a), which gave constitutional charter cities "all powers
1 26
which the general assembly ... has authority to confer upon any city.
The purpose behind this amendment was to broaden and clarify the powers of
home-rule cities.1 27 The legislative history of the amendment stated that
home-rule cities' powers would be "coextensive with the power of the state
legislature as long as the state legislature [did] not take positive steps to deny
specific powers."' 2 The amendment limited the powers of the city with the
provision "provided such powers are consistent with the constitution of this

119. See Mo. CONST. art. VI, §§ 18(a), 19, 31 (1875).
120. Id. art. IX, § 16.
121. Sterchi, State-Local Conflicts Under the New Missouri Home Rule
Amendment, 37 Mo. L. REv. 677 (1972).
122. Id. at 679-770.
123. Westbrook, Municipal Home Rule: An Evaluation of the Missouri
Experience, 33 Mo. L. REv. 45 (1968).
124. Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception, 20
UCLA L. REv. 671 (1973).

125. 1968 REPORT OF GOVERNOR's ADVISORY COUNCIL ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER CITIEs

at 60-64.

126. Mo. CONST. art. 6, § 19(a).
127. 1968 REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S

ADVISORY COUNCIL ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAw: CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER CITIES at 64-66.

128. Id. at 63.
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state and are not limited or denied either by the charter so adopted or by
statute."' 29 Therefore, the amendment changed the status of the city charter
from an instrument of grant, in which the city had only those powers specified
in the charter, to one of limitation in which the city had all powers except
those prohibited by its charter or the state constitution or statutes.13 °
The constitutional amendment was intended to extinguish court tests
determining if ordinances covered subjects of local or statewide concern and
to shift the courts' focus to whether there was conflict between a local
ordinance and the state constitution or statutes."' The legislative history
states that ordinances could be struck down because of actual conflict between
state and local legislation ot because the state legislation was so comprehensive that it "indicate[d] a clear intent" to occupy the field.132
No Missouri cases have discussed whether a charter city has the power
to enact a right-to-work ordinance. Yet under the broad power given charter
cities, it seems logical that a right-to-work ordinance should stand if it133does
not conflict with a state statute, a statutory scheme, or the constitution.
Missouri does not have a labor relations act,"3 but it has two provisions
in the constitution that relate to labor relations. Article I, section 2 states that
"all persons shall have.., the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry

...."The Missouri Supreme Court has held that article I, section 2 does not
prohibit union security agreements. 135 Article I, section 29 of the Missouri
Constitution provides "[t]hat employees shall have the right to organize and
136
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing."
While this provision has not been interpreted to prohibit union security

129. Mo. CONST. art. 6, § 19(a).
130. 1968 REPORT OF GOVERNOR's ADVISORY COUNCIL ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW: CONsTTrUTIONAL CHARTER CITEs at 64. See also Westbrook, supra note 123,

at 46-50.
131. 1968 REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER CITIES at 64.

132. Id. at 56.
133. The Missouri Attorney General's office has issued a memorandum and an
opinion on the issue. The opinion letter addressed the issue of whether a local
governmental body, such as a county commission or city council, could enact a rightto-work ordinance. Op. Att'y Gen. 78-86 (1986). The memorandum addressed the
issue of whether a charter city or county could enact a right-to-work ordinance. Mem.
Att'y Gen. (March 11, 1987) (response to opinion request 135-86). In both the
opinion letter and the memorandum, the attorney general expressed the opinion that
federal law preempts local right-to-work ordinances.
134. Missouri does have a labor relations statute covering public employees. See
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 105.500-.530 (1986).
135. Independent Stave Co. v. Higdon, 572 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. 1978).
136. Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 29.
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agreements, it has been cited as indicating a strong public policy to protect
employees from coercion to join in union activity for collective bargaining.137 It does not appear that a local right-to-work ordinance would conflict
with either constitutional provision because a right-to-work law does not
prevent employees from organizing and bargaining collectively. A right-towork law simply prevents employers and unions from forcing employees to
join a union.

In the cases following the passage of article VI, section 19(a), the
Missouri Supreme Court generally has followed legislative intent in determining whether a city has the power to enact a particular ordinance.' 38 In Cape
3 9 the court stated
Motor Lodge v. City of Cape Girardeau,'
Under section 19(a), the emphasis no longer is whether a home rule
city has the authority to exercise the power involved; the emphasis is
whether the exercise of that power conflicts with the Missouri Constitution,
state statutes or the charter itself. Conflicts between local enactments and
state law provisions are matters of statutory construction. Once a determination of conflict between a constitutional or statutory provision and a
charter or ordinance provision is made, the state law provision controls.
The test for determining if a conflict exists is whether the ordinance
"permits what the statute prohibits" or "prohibits what the statute per1 40
mits."
The court also addressed the issue of state statutes that are so comprehensive they occupy the field of legislation.141 The court implied that occupation of the field should not be found easily, and it advocated a cautious
approach in finding that statutes granting power to non-home-rule cities
impliedly limit the powers of home-rule cities. 42 The court stated that
section 70.220 of the Missouri Revised Statutes and article VI, section 16 of
the Missouri Constitution (dealing with cooperation between political
subdivisions) do not indicate that the "express enumeration of the entities

137. Quinn v. Buchanan, 298 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1957); Tallman Co. v. Latal, 365
Mo. 552, 284 S.W.2d 547 (1955); Bellerive Country Club v. McVey, 365 Mo. 477,
284 S.W.2d 492 (1955).
138. Cape Motor Lodge, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 706 S.W.2d 208 (Mo.
1986); Frech v. City of Columbia, 693 S.W.2d 813 (Mo. 1985); Hannah ex rel. Christ
v. City of St. Charles, 676 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1984); St. Louis Children's Hosp. v.
Conway, 582 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. 1979).
139. 706 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. 1986).
140. Id. at 211 (citing St. Louis Children'sHosp., 582 S.W.2d at 691; Hannah,
676 S.W.2d at 513) (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 212.
142. Id.
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named are to be considered as the exclusion of others not named. 143 The
court decisions interpreting section 19(a) home-rule powers show judicial
willingness to uphold city ordinances unless there is a strong showing of
legislative intent not to permit such ordinances. Under this reasoning, a
home-rule city should have authority to enact a right-to-work ordinance absent
a showing of a conflicting state statute or statutory scheme. Because Missouri
does not have a labor relations act, it would seem less likely that conflict
would exist between a local right-to-work ordinance and a state statute.
This conclusion, however, is clouded by a recent decision of the Missouri
Supreme Court. The case, Yellow FreightSystems, Inc. v. Mayor's Commission,'" concerned an ordinance enacted by the City of Springfield. The
ordinance established an administrative agency, the Mayor's Commission on
Human Rights, to hear cases and give relief to plaintiffs suffering discrimination in employment and housing. 145 The ordinance provided a right of
appeal in the county circuit court or in the city municipal court.1 46 An
employee of Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. (Yellow Freight) filed a complaint
alleging unlawful discrimination and the Commission ordered Yellow Freight
to reinstate the employee and to give her back pay. 147 Yellow Freight
appealed.'"

The Missouri Supreme Court, sitting en banc, struck down the ordinance,
First, the court held that the ordinance conflicted with article V,section 23 of
the Missouri Constitution, which requires "[a] municipal judge [to] hear and
determine violations of municipal ordinances ...."' The court held that
the Mayor's Commission had no jurisdiction to adjudicate discrimination
claims.'-" Then the court, while admitting it could have struck down the
ordinance on the jurisdictional ground alone, went on to discuss the scope of
home-rule power in Missouri.'
The court cited Marshall v. Kansas City, 52 which dealt with a pre19(a) home-rule ordinance prohibiting race discrimination in restaurants and
hotels. In Marshall,the Missouri Supreme Court, sitting en banc, upheld the
ordinance by concluding that Kansas City's police powers included the right
to regulate businesses, and therefore, the city had the right to prohibit

143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
791 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. 1990).
Id. at 383.
Id.

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 384-85.
150. Id. at 383-84.
151. Id. at 385.
152. 355 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1962).
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discrimination in those businesses. 13 The plaintiffs in Marshall contended
that a municipality could not enact civil rights legislation because it could not

"create by ordinance a right of action between third persons or enlarge the

15 4
common law or statutory duty or liability of citizens among themselves."
The court responded by stating there was little support for this rule and that
even if the rule were correct, the Kansas City ordinance expressly stated that
it did not "add to nor detract from any civil remedies now available to persons
subjected to racial discrimination.' 55
The Yellow Freight court did not overrule Marshall, but it gave much
greater weight to the rule that an ordinance cannot impose liability between
private persons. The court stated that "[i]t has been repeatedly ruled in this
state that a city has no power, by municipal ordinance, to create a civil
liability from one citizen to another, nor to relieve one citizen from that
liability by imposing it on another."' 56
In support of its holding, the Yellow Freight court cited prior decisions
that held that home-rule cities possess "all power which the legislature is
authorized to grant"'157 and "all powers which are not limited or denied by
the constitution, by statute or by the charter itself."' 58 These decisions
clearly reflected the legislative intent behind the section 19(a) amendment.
The court then stated that the amount of power the General Assembly may
confer is subject to some limitation.' 59 In setting the limitation, the court
held that the "power of the municipality to legislate shall be confined to

153. Id. at 881.
154. Id. at 882 (citing 6 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORAIONS § 22 (3d ed.
1949); Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944) (only case
supporting this theory)).
155. Marshall, 355 S.W.2d at 883 (citing KANSAS CITY, MO. CODE § 39.261,
para. (f) (1960)).
156. Yellow Freight Sys. v. Mayor's Comm'n, 791 S.W.2d 382,384 (Mo. 1990).
The court's decision that the Springfield Mayor's Commission "had no power to

determine the respondent [employer] had violated an ordinance of the city" was based
on a holding that even a charter city ordinance cannot create a private cause of action
enforceable by the city itself. Id. at 387. Under this principle, however, Missouri
courts have held that where the ordinance is penal in nature, it does not create a new
liability, but rather it merely defines the duty already owed at common law to the
public or the injured party. See State ex rel. Wells v. Mayfield, 365 Mo. 238, 281
S.W.2d 9, 13 (1955); Grimes v. Standard Oil Co., 370 S.W.2d 627, 634 (Mo. Ct. App.
1963).
157. Yellow Freight, 791 S.W.2d at 385 (citing St. Louis Children's Hosp. v.
Conway, 582 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Mo. 1979)).
158. Id. (citing Hannah ex rel. Christ v. City of St. Charles, 676 S.W.2d 508, 512
(Mo. 1984)).
159. Id.
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municipal affairs."' 60 This holding contradicts the legislative history of
section 19(a) which states as one of its purposes the rejection of "state-local
tests" used by the courts.' 6' The legislative history expresses the view that

limits on home-rule power should come from the legislature: "the legislature
162
could override any substantive provision in a charter or ordinance."
The court's departure from its past holdings and its disregard of the

legislative intent behind section 19(a) is puzzling, and it raises serious
problems for any home-rule city that wishes to enact a right-to-work
ordinance. Under Yellow Freight,a right-to-work ordinance may not change
legal obligations between private parties. If a collective bargaining agreement
contains a union security clause requiring employees to join the union, and a
city ordinance invalidates that security clause, the legal obligations of the
parties are changed. If a city has a right-to-work ordinance and an employer
violates the ordinance by firing employees who refuse to join the union, the
most likely remedies for an employee would be reinstatement and back pay.
But under Yellow Freight, the municipality does not have the power to
determine the ordinance was violated and to require reinstatement and back
pay for the employee.
In addition, Yellow Freight only permits the city to enact ordinances
affecting local concerns. Is the right to work primarily a local concern, or a
statewide concern? Certainly there are strong arguments for both sides,
making the right-to-work issue a prime example of the definitional problem
section 19(a) was designed to eliminate. Under Yellow Freight,the courts will
now have to apply the state-local test, and cities, uncertain of the scope of
their powers, probably will choose not to act.
The Yellow Freight court rejected Springfield's attempt to use Missouri
Revised Statute section 213.020.3163 to retroactively validate its 1982
ordinance.' 64 Section 213.020.3 permits local governments, prior to August
13, 1986, to enact ordinances creating human relations commissions with "the
power and authority to seek to eliminate and prevent discrimination in
employment."' 16 5 The court said that section 213.020.3 did not give local

160. Id. (quoting Kansas City, Mo. v. J.E. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 337 Mo.
913, 923, 87 S.W.2d 195, 200 (1935)).
161. 1968 REPORT OF GOvERNOR's ADVIsoRY COUNCIL ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAw: CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER CITIES at 63.

162. Id. at 64.
163. Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.020.3 (1986).
164. Yellow Freight,791 S.W.2d at 387.
165. Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.020.3 (1986) (emphasis added).
Prior to August 13, 1986, the governing body of any city, town, village or
county may adopt an ordinance or ordinances which authorizes the creation
of a human relations or equal opportunity enforcement commission with the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss4/3
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governments the power to "create an agency to determine and enforce a
violation" of human rights ordinances.'6 It contrasted section 213.020.3
with Missouri Revised Statute section 213.030,67 which creates the State
Commission on Human Rights. The court said the State Commission was
expressly granted power to "hold hearings and pass upon complaints of
power only
violations of state law,"' 6 but a local commission was granted 169
to "seek to eliminate discrimination as an advisory commission."
There are currently efforts in the Missouri General Assembly to adopt
legislation to legitimize local human rights commissions. If the General
Assembly amends section 213.020.3 and authorizes charter cities to adopt
ordinances protecting the civil rights of employees, and if it gives the cities
or private citizens the right to enforce those ordinances, then a right-to-work
ordinance may be enforceable under article 6, section 19(a) of the Missouri
Constitution.
Under the current statutes, a Missouri charter city may enact a right-towork ordinance to express the community's attitude about union security
agreements. The NLRB recently held that where the city of Caruthersville,
Missouri, a third class city, had enacted a right-to-work ordinance, it was not
unlawful for an employer to post a notice concerning the ordinance.170 The
union claimed that posting the ordinance demonstrated the employer's

intention not to bargain in good faith for a union security clause,17' The
NLRB ruled that the employer did not indicate it would not bargain in good
faith, but merely posted the notice to show that the ordinance existed, and
presumably to show the community's attitude about union security agreements.
Federal law does not compel an employer to agree to a union security
clause; it only requires employers to bargain in good faith.' 2 The NLRB
has ruled that it is not a per se violation of an employer's bargaining duty to

power and authority to seek to eliminate and prevent discrimination in
employment, housing and public accommodation and to establish other
related programs.
Id.
166. Yellow Freight,791 S.W.2d at 387.
167. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 213.020.3, 213.030 (1986).
168. Yellow Freight, 791 S.W.2d at 387 (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 213.030

(1986)).
169. Id. at 387.

170. Colson Equipment, Inc., 299 N.L.R.B. No. 115, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1097
(Sept. 27, 1990).
171. The union stated that in light of the Missouri Attorney General opinion and
memorandum stating the conclusion that federal law preempted right-to-work
ordinances, the employer showed bad faith by continuing to post the ordinance. Id.
at 1098. See supra note 2.
172. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1973).
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take a strong stand against including a union security clause in the collective
bargaining agreement, even if the clause existed in a previous agreement.173
IV. CONCLUSION
It seems clear that a charter city in Missouri could enact a local right-towork ordinance to express the community's attitude against union security
agreements. There should be no basis for a claim of federal preemption of
right-to-work ordinances. Section 14(b) of the NLRA expressly disclaims any
intention to preempt state right-to-work laws. "State laws" under section 14(b)
should be construed broadly to include local ordinances.
In view of Yellow Freight, it is unlikely that a right-to-work ordinance
could be used other than to show that the community disapproves of union
security agreements. Right-to-work ordinances may help employers resist
demands for union security agreements by showing community support for
their position. Employers have a duty to consider union security agreements
in good faith, but they have no duty to concede to union demands on this
issue. An employer can legally reject a demand for a union security clause
as a matter of principle without violating the duty to bargain in good faith.
If the Missouri General Assembly grants broad powers to local governments to adopt and enforce human rights ordinances, local right-to-work
ordinances may become enforceable. Until then, right-to-work ordinances may
be useful only as an expression of community disapproval of compulsory
unionism. This expression of disapproval may be helpful to communities
wishing to attract industries that are considering locating in states where rightto-work laws are in force.
PAMELA A. ROLFS

173. Spingfield Elec. Serv. Co., 285 N.L.R.B. 1305, 127 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1103,
1106 (1987).
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